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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
The election of Porfirio Lobos formally ended the crisis 
created by the Honduran Supreme Court‘s decision to 
remove democratically elected President José Manuel Zelaya 
from office on June 28, 2009.   Yet, profound consequences 
from the decision persist.  Honduras remains regionally 
isolated, economically weak, and internally divided over the 
applicability of the current constitution for resolving future 
political predicaments. The crisis has contributed to the 
entrenchment of opposing views, polarizing of society in an 
unprecedented way, and the exacerbation of Hondurans‘ 
distrust in state institutions.     
 
The opportunity for renewed instability remains the case for 
Honduras, in part, due to the lack of sustained, 
institutionalized democracy. As expressed succinctly by J. 
Mark Ruhl:  ―The outlook for democracy in Honduras is 
uncertain.‖1 The current system is broken: calls for ―a new 
Honduras‖ have been expressed from different sectors of 
society, from government officials to grassroots 
organizations.  If a ―new‖ Honduras is to emerge, it must 
provide a more competitive political and economic system 
                                                             
1
 J. Mark Ruhl, ―Honduras Unravels,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, 
No. 2, April 2010, p. 94, 
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0318_honduras_casaszamora.
aspx?p=1. Also, since 2004, Seligson and Booth had found that political 
legitimacy was thin and that justification for a military coup in Honduras 
was higher than in any other country in Latin America. See, Michael A. 
Seligson and John A. Booth, ―Predicting Coups?  Democratic 
Vulnerabilities, the AmericansBarometer and the 2009 Honduran Crisis,‖  
Latin American Public Opinion Project, “Insights” Series," 2009, 
www.AmericasBarometer.org. 
  
2 
 
that guarantees all Hondurans tangible opportunities to 
improve their wellbeing.  
 
Honduras is at a crossroads. The unsettling episode of 
President Zelaya‘s (forced) removal from office offers an 
opportunity for inaugurating substantive change.  The crisis 
has had the effect of raising widespread social consciousness 
and awareness of the importance of democratic values.  It 
has also galvanized new organizations to engage in national 
political discourse, particularly by way of social media.  
Failure of the State to take advantage of heightened 
awareness, interest and participation by the mass populace 
and to respond to Hondurans‘ long standing social demands 
for inclusion and equality could lead, sooner or later, to the 
rise of new messianic leaders seeking to profit from 
Hondurans‘ distaste for ―politics as usual.‖    
 
Restoring Honduras‘ social fabric requires building trust and 
credibility in the State and its institutions.  The government 
of Honduras (GOH) needs to produce verifiable results that 
directly and rapidly impact citizens‘ wellbeing.  The State 
could achieve this goal by implementing a short-term agenda 
focusing on three key issues: promoting reconciliation, 
fighting corruption, and improving citizens‘ security.  
Obtaining some degree of positive results could help 
Hondurans believe that positive change is possible, and thus 
lay the groundwork for much needed long-term reforms.  If 
Honduras is to accomplish this task, it requires the support of 
the international community. 
 
3 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Values, beliefs, traditions, customs, morals, law, and 
institutions all help comprise the social fabric that binds a 
nation together.  Shared cultural components help create a 
strong and cohesive society; pulled or broken threads stress 
and/or tear at the social fabric.  The constitutional crisis in 
2009 created a significant amount of turmoil that stressed 
Honduras‘ social fabric. One year later, Hondurans remain 
anxious over how and when reconciliation will take full 
effect. 
 
The ouster of President José Manuel Zelaya sharply split 
Honduran society.  Families, friends, and colleagues took 
sides with Golpistas (who supported Zelaya‘s removal) or 
the Resistencia (who rejected it).  More importantly, 
Hondurans who had opposed Zelaya‘s policies also wrestled 
with the legality of the Supreme Court‘s and Armed Forces‘ 
decisions and actions, respectively.
2
 These perceptions 
pertaining to the legality of the ouster in turn influenced 
Hondurans‘ acceptance or rejection of Roberto Micheletti‘s 
transitional government and of the legitimacy of the 
November 2009 election that brought Porfirio Lobo to office.  
Despite the richness of the constitutional discussions that 
followed, the events that set the election into motion startled 
                                                             
** Information for this paper is based primarily on interviews conducted 
by the authors during field research to Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 
February 2010.  Substantial research was also conducted by Gina A. 
Moreno, at ARC.  
2
 In surveys conducted by different organizations, between 46 and 60 
percent of those surveyed opposed the way Zelaya was removed from 
power. The Supreme Court acted at the request of the Attorney General, 
and gave orders to the Armed Forces to arrest Zelaya.  The arrest should 
have been assigned to local/state police.  
4 
 
Hondurans, especially the young, who for the past two 
decades had witnessed peaceful transfers of power.
3
 
 
The crisis produced other serious consequences. It 
exacerbated Hondurans‘ lack of trust in already discredited 
institutions. Economic activity came to a standstill as 
protesters took to the street and international donors 
suspended foreign assistance.  Businesses were looted and 
burned.  Several people died during the violence.  Strong-
arm law enforcement tactics against protesters led to several 
allegations of human rights violations. Tension increased as 
international mediation efforts failed, and Zelaya returned to 
the country seeking diplomatic asylum at the Brazilian 
embassy. For six months violence and fear dominated 
everyday life for most Hondurans.  While the immediate 
crisis subsided after the new presidential election, the effects 
of the conflict have persisted.
4
    
 
This paper will thus briefly examine some of the key 
stressors of the Honduran social fabric in light of the ouster, 
such as polarization, lack of trust in institutions, corruption, 
and lack of citizens‘ security.  In sum, this paper contends 
that Honduras is at a crossroads, and that the GOH has an 
                                                             
3
 Honduras has a well-documented history of dictatorships. The transition 
to democratic rule began in 1982. 
4
 See, J. Mark Ruhl, ―Honduras Unravels,‖ opp. Cit; and Alvaro Calix, 
―Honduras: de la crisis política al surgimiento de un nuevo actor social,‖ 
Nueva Sociedad, No. 226, March-April 2010, www.nuso.org. See also, 
an analysis of events prior to June 2009 in Ambassador Charles A. Ford 
(retired), ―Re-setting our Engagement with Central America:  Lessons 
from the Honduran Crisis,‖ Perspectives on the Americas University of 
Miami, Center for Hemispheric Policy, June 22, 2010; and Kevin Casas-
Zamora, ―Next Steps for Honduras,‖ Testimony on the political crisis in 
Honduras before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Brookings Institution, March 18, 
2010. 
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opportunity to implement serious reforms to alleviate the risk 
of renewed instability.   
 
A POLARIZED SOCIETY 
 
Honduran society was on the path of polarization long before 
the crisis that erupted in June 2009.       Zelaya was turning 
more ideologically motivated than he seemed when elected 
in 2005.  The traditional elites rejected his call for a 
Constitutional Assembly-- the now famous ―fourth ballot 
box‖ --believing that Zelaya intended to change the law that 
banned presidential reelection.  Also worrisome was 
Zelaya‘s closeness to President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela 
and fears that Honduras would follow the Venezuelan path.  
With this fear, stopping Zelaya resonated well with many 
Hondurans.   
 
Others saw it differently, however.  Shortly before his 
removal, Zelaya enjoyed a 62 percent approval rating.
5
 His 
social policies, including the 60 percent increase in minimum 
wages that had caused havoc on the economy, had benefited 
the less-privileged sectors.  These groups also welcomed his 
decision to join the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas 
(ALBA) because it provided much-needed developmental 
aid.
6
 The growing political gap turned into a war of words in 
                                                             
5
 CIMA, ―Honduras,‖ Barómetro Iberoaméricano de Gobernabilidad 
2009, www.cimaiberoamerica.com. 
6
 The Zelaya administration also received substantial assistance for 
poverty reduction from the US and other donors.  For example, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a 5-year, US $205 
million Compact Contract with Honduras to ―increase the productivity 
and business skills of farmers and to reduce transportation costs between 
targeted production centers and national, regional and global markets.‖  
In September 2009, the MCC suspended two of the activities scheduled 
under the Compact based on ―the undemocratic political activities of 
6 
 
the media and fueled strong sentiments in favor or against 
every decision made by the Zelaya Administration.  The 
class struggle was deepening by the time the crisis erupted. 
By 2010, the Americas Barometer survey found that ―the 
coup and its outcome appear to have opened a stark 
difference between socioeconomic classes and their support 
for democracy.‖7 
 
Considering the growing political tension, the sharp split of 
Honduran society in June 2009 was not unexpected.  
Unanticipated perhaps was the extent and level of 
segmentation that occurred.    Extremism reigned among the 
splintered groups, and ―the truth was lost in the process.‖8  
There were no winners in the struggle; only losers.       
 
The intensity of socio-political polarization in Honduras has 
not diminished. The Honduran society is divided between 
those that believe that the Constitution is still valid and those 
that believe that it needs to be revised and reformed.
9
 
Ironically, the call for a Constitutional Assembly that 
triggered Zelaya‘s removal from office remains today a 
critical barrier separating Hondurans.  
 
                                                                                                                            
June 2009.‖, but by March 2010, Honduras had received US$152.5 
million of the allocated funds.   
7
 The findings suggest that the coup and its resolution decreased upper 
class Hondurans‘ satisfaction with democracy, much more than for 
poorer Hondurans. See:  Orlando J. Pérez, John A. Booth and Mitchell A. 
Seligson, ―The Honduran Catharsis,‖ An American Barometer Insights 
Series Report, Americas Quarterly, August 2010, 
http://www.americasquarterly.org/honduran-catharsis.  
8
  Interview with members of civil society organizations who asked to not 
be identified. Tegucigalpa, February 2010.   
9
 ―Comisión de la Verdad enfrenta enorme polarización: Stein,‖ La 
Tribuna, Tegucigalpa, HN: May 19, 2010, 
http://www.latribuna.hn/web2.0/?p=133627.  
7 
 
LACK OF TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS  
 
Hondurans‘ trust in institutions is among the lowest in Latin 
America.  Even prior to 2009, citizens had little respect for 
Congress, Supreme Court, police, and Elections Tribunal.  
They trusted local government more than the political 
parties, which were at the bottom of the scale.  Only the 
institutional churches and international donors earned the 
trust of large segments of the population.  The media and the 
Armed Forces also enjoyed significant levels of trust (see 
below). 
 
Most trusted institutions, 2009 
Institution Percentage 
Catholic Church 38% 
Evangelical Church 37.5 
International donor agencies 27.5 
Media 18.1 
Armed Forces 15.6 
Human Rights Commissioner 10.7 
Municipal governments 10.3 
Institution Access Information 9.5 
Supreme Court 7.8 
Superior Court of Accounts 6.6 
Superior Elections Tribunal 6.5 
Labor unions 6.4 
Police 6.4 
Anti Corruption Attorney General 6.1 
National Congress 4.7 
Political Parties 2.1 
Source:  CNA, Informe Nacional de Transparencia, 2009 
 
8 
 
The 2009 events further undermined Hondurans‘ confidence 
in their institutions. Zelaya‘s removal and replacement by 
Roberto Micheletti as interim president involved decisions 
by the Supreme Court, Congress, the Office of the Attorney 
General, and the military, among others.   For the majority 
who opposed the ouster, it was precisely the decisions made 
by these institutions and their compliance or non-compliance 
with the constitution that raised the legality question and 
further undermined trust in public institutions.  
 
Of greater significance was the impact of the crisis on the 
most trusted institutions. Unexpectedly, the trusted Catholic 
Church took sides rather than assume the role of mediator to 
the torn society.  The highly respected Cardinal Oscar 
Andrés Rodríguez asked President Zelaya during a live 
broadcast in July not to return to the country, a call 
interpreted as Church support for the interim government.
10
  
In August, Cardinal Rodríguez explained that, ―If we look 
back at what happened, we will discover the law was not 
respected because the highest authority was the first to 
violate it,‖11 again blaming Zelaya for his downfall.  
Regardless of which side it took, the fact that the Church 
took one side over the other significantly disappointed many 
                                                             
10
 Radio Evangelización, ―Sacerdote hondureño condena posición del 
Cardenal Rodríguez,‖ Radio Evangelización, 10 July 2009, 
http://www.radioevangelizacion.org/spip.php?article3297. See also, 
―Ecologics, La Postura Política de la Iglesia Católica en Honduras: el 
Cardenal Óscar Andrés Rodríguez Madariaga,‖ 16 July 2010, 
http://ecologics.wordpress.com/2009/07/12/la-postura-de-la-iglesia-
catolica-en-honduras-el-cardenal-oscar-andres-rodriguez-maradiaga; and 
Cardinal Rodríguez live broadcast at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMuZ94aFurM.  
11
 Catholic News Agency, ―Cardinal Rodriguez: ‗Church supports 
reconciliation in Honduras‘,‖ Tegucigalpa, Honduras:  10 August 2009, 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/cardinal_rodriguez_church_s
upports_reconciliation_in_honduras/.  
9 
 
Hondurans.  It hurt one key element of Honduras social 
fabric and raised doubts about the Church‘s role in post-
conflict efforts at reconciliation.  
 
Similarly, there was despair over the role of the media during 
the conflict.  The mass media, although owned and 
controlled by a handful of wealthy families, had enjoyed a 
high level of credibility. That the media supported Zelaya‘s 
removal was expected given previous antagonisms between 
the media and the Zelaya government. For the average 
citizen, anguish came not from media support for the 
―Golpistas,” but rather for failing to provide accurate, 
objective, and timely information during the crisis.
12
  Again, 
one of the trusted institutions led Hondurans down.  
 
The Armed Forces, prior to the constitutional crisis was also 
held in relatively high esteem by the population.  At least 15 
percent of the population viewed it as one of the most trusted 
institutions (2009). Yet, only 27 percent of those surveyed 
approved the Armed Forces‘ role in arresting and taking 
Zelaya into exile, while 58 opposed it.
13
  The military had 
been thrown back to a role that many Hondurans had hoped 
was long gone.    
 
The reaction of the international community, particularly the 
US, also took many by surprise.  The US‘s strong rejection 
                                                             
12
 See, Leticia Salomón, ―El golpe de estado en Honduras: Antecedentes, 
desarrollo y perspectivas. Notas para comprender lo que ha ocurrido y lo 
que puede ocurrir,‖ Meeting with Honduran economist and sociologists 
Leticia Salomon at Tulane University, Center for Inter-American Policy 
and Research, October 19, 2009, 
http://cipr.tulane.edu/home/events/19/meeting-with-Honduran-
economist-and-sociologist-leticia-salomon%C3%B3n. 
13
 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2009, Santiago de Chile, CH, 
Banco de Datos en Línea, www.latinobarometro.org.  
10 
 
of the coup and calls for Zelaya‘s restoration surprised the 
elites, particularly the entrepreneurs that had supported his 
removal from office. Considering its history of close 
relations with the US, they were angered by Washington‘s 
reaction.  In fact, the State Department revoked US visas for 
19 top-ranking Hondurans, including the interim president 
(Micheletti), the foreign minister, 14 Supreme Court justices 
and several business people, among them Adolfo Facussé, 
the head of the powerful National Association of Industries 
(Asociación Nacional de Industrias—ANDI).14  Inexplicable 
for these elites was watching the United States, Venezuela 
and Cuba on the same side of the conflict calling for 
President Zelaya‘s return to office.  
 
CORRUPTION, CRIME, AND CITIZEN SECURITY  
 
Hondurans‘ persistent lack of trust in public institutions 
correlates with their perceptions of corruption in such 
institutions.   In 2009, almost 80 percent of Hondurans 
viewed politicians as the most corrupt followed by public 
officials, police, and members of Congress, judges, and 
ministers.  Hondurans identify corruption, along with 
unemployment and citizen security, as their top three 
concerns.
15
   
 
Corruption in Honduras is endemic and systemic.  
Corruption assessments conducted in country show that 
corruption is rampant in Congress, the executive, the judicial 
sector, the political parties, and the electoral process, as well 
                                                             
14
 Honduras News, ―Adolfo Facussé Deported from US,‖ Honduras 
News, 13 September 2009, 
http://www.hondurasnews.com/2009/09/13/adolfo-facusse-deported-
from-us/.  
15
 CIMA, opp. cit. p. 174. 
11 
 
as in the delivery of services, security institutions and every 
sector of society.
 16
   Excessive levels of discretion in the 
handling of public funds, conflict of interests, and private-
public sector collusion, influence peddling and much more 
characterize corruption in most institutions. More notably, 
there exist no functional systems of checks and balances or 
oversight to regulate, prevent, control, and prosecute 
corruption.    
 
Corruption is inevitably linked to illicit trafficking.  The 
State Department reports that ―official corruption continues 
to be an impediment to effective law enforcement and there 
are press reports of drug trafficking and associated criminal 
activity among current and former government and military 
officials.‖17 A recent study has found that security costs and 
losses due to crime absorbed nearly 10 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP).
18
    
 
Drug trafficking and corruption, particularly as it discredits 
authority and tolerates impunity, translates into crime and 
violence, which further discredits the institutions in question.  
The GOH is failing to provide safety for its citizens.  The US 
State Department reports that crime is endemic in Honduras; 
poverty, gangs, and low apprehension and conviction rates of 
criminals contribute to a significant crime rate, including acts 
                                                             
16
 The authors have conducted corruption assessments in Honduras in the 
past. The same conclusions have been reached by the CNA. 
17
 US State Department, ―2009 INCSR:  Country Reports – Honduras 
through Mexico,‖ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report (INCSR), Washington, DC:  February 27, 2009, 
www.state.gov/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol 1/116522.htm. 
18
 Quoted in: USAID, Audit of the USAID/Honduras Democracy and 
Governance Program, San Salvador, ES:  Office of the Inspector 
General, Audit Report No. 1-522-09-009-P, June 4, 2009, p. 3. 
12 
 
of mass murder.  Kidnappings are increasing and ―express 
kidnapping‖—affecting common individuals—is on the 
rise.
19
  The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
reported in 2008 that, with a population of approximately 7.3 
million people, Honduras has one of the world‘s highest per 
capita murder rates.
20
  The conflicts within the police itself 
and between police and Armed Forces over drug 
enforcement and interdiction issues reflect a conflict between 
cartels, which also has the potential to escalate.   
 
Unemployment is also linked to crime and corruption. The 
increasing unemployment rate, the greater number of youths 
there are available in the streets with the potential to join 
drug trafficking gangs. Unemployment increased 
dramatically after President Zelaya authorized the sixty 
percent increase in salaries, which small business could not 
sustain. The global economic crisis contributed to the 
economic dislocation caused by the political crisis. Many 
young people in remote municipalities are being trained by 
the cartels as boat operators, truck drivers, as well as other 
jobs that help with drug smuggling. Deportation of 
Hondurans who have committed crimes in the US (and often 
have been incarcerated) fuels not only increased 
unemployment but crime and insecurity as well.
21
  
 
DEEDS NEEDED  
 
President Porfirio Lobo came into office with 56 percent of 
the popular vote.  The high approval rating suggested that the 
                                                             
19
 US State Department, opp. Cit.  
20
 US State Department, ―Honduras:  Country Specific Information,‖ at 
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1135.html.   
21
 Honduras Weekly, ―Deportations of Hondurans down by 17%,‖ 
December 26, 2009. http://hondurasweekly.com/national/2023-
deportations-of-hondurans-from-us-declining.  
13 
 
majority of the population accepted the election as 
legitimate. His campaign team drafted a low-key campaign 
promising reconciliation and unity in response to growing 
demands for clear and honest signals of restoring legitimacy 
and achieving reconciliation.
22
  President Lobo also faces the 
development challenges that traditionally have plagued 
Honduras and that are the basis for the high levels of socio-
economic underdevelopment.  
   
Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Central America, 
whether poverty is measured against the local poverty line 
(51 percent, the second highest in the region), the $2/day 
poverty line (35 percent, the highest in the region), or the 
$1.25/day extreme poverty line (22 percent, the highest in 
the region). Social indicators are low, with male/female life 
expectancy at birth at 66 and 73 years, respectively, the 
lowest in the Central American region. The second highest 
percentage of the population in the region not using an 
improved water source is Honduras.
23
 
 
During his first six months in office, the Lobo administration 
emphasized mending fences abroad.  Restoring relations 
with neighbors became a priority, as well as lobbying for a 
return to the Organization of American States (OAS), which 
suspended Honduras in June 2009 for President Zelaya‘s 
                                                             
22
  Lobo‘s campaign manager was the well-know political strategist Juan 
José Rendón. See, MegaTV, María Elvira Salazar‘s interview with J.J. 
Rendón in Bogotá, Colombia, broadcast in Miami on 5 July 2010. See 
also, PRNewswires, ―Political Mastermind and Strategist JJ Rendon 
Once Again the Driving Force Behind Juan Manuel, Forbes.com, 22 
June 2010, 
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/prnewswire/2010/06/22/prnewswire201006
221552 PR_NEWS_USPR_____DC24965.html.  
23
USAID, Audit of the USAID/Honduras Democracy and Governance 
Program, opp. Cit., p. 3. 
14 
 
ouster.  At home, attention focused on revitalizing the 
economy and recovering from the loss of international 
assistance and foreign investment.  Regarding development 
programs, Lobo adopted the Visión de País 2010-2038 (A 
Country Vision 2010-2038), a 38- year development plan, 
and a Plan de Nación 2010-2022 (The Nation‘s Plan 2010-
2022), a strategy for its implementation over the next 12 
years.
24
    
 
The Vision and Nation plans will serve as the government‘s 
development blueprint for the next seven administrations.  
Drafted mostly by the Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa 
Privada--COHEP (Honduras‘ Private Sector Council), the 
Plans incorporate several previous plans—including one 
drafted under the Zelaya administration.  A careful review of 
the two plans indicates that they are overly ambitious, do not 
focus on resolving immediate concerns, and have unrealistic 
timeframes.
25
  
 
Also in process is the implementation of the San José and 
Tegucigalpa Accords signed in July and October 2009 by 
Micheletti and Zelaya negotiators. The accords called for the 
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Named by the Organization of American States in May 
2010, the Commission (Comision de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación-CVR), is headed by Eduardo Stein, former 
vice president of Guatemala. The CVR hopes to contribute to 
―the clarification for some of the most delicate and stringent 
issues surrounding the events of June 28 [2009]… to provide 
those sectors of Honduran society that have antagonistic 
                                                             
24
 República de Honduras, Visión de País 2010-2018 y Plan de Nación 
2010-2022,  January 2010. 
25
 Ibid. 
15 
 
views an opportunity to express their own experiences and 
what they went through.‖26   
 
The CVR is distrusted by both ―golpista‖ and ―resistencia” 
sectors.   Stein explains that, ―on the far right they consider 
[the Commission] a Trojan horse that will promote 
constitutional reform and among the Zelayistas and the 
resistance, they see us just as an extension of the coup, only 
window-dressing.‖27  Still, Stein is an optimist, and expects 
the Honduran leadership to agree, as happened in Guatemala 
and El Salvador during the peace agreement, to look ahead 
and work jointly for the future of Honduras.  
 
The new social groups that emerged during the crisis and 
remain active have identified investigation of human rights 
violations as essential to a reconciliation process. The CVR 
has agreed to collect the testimony of victims and also look 
at the allegations of human rights violations reported by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).  
These include human rights abuses continued under the Lobo 
administration. According to the IACHR, several people 
have been murdered, including journalists and human rights 
defenders, and there is an ―absence of effective 
investigations that could lead to clarification of these 
events.‖28 The IACHR has also reported on threats and 
                                                             
26
 Tracy Wilkinson, ―Q&A:  Guatemalan seeks answers in Honduran 
coup,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/09/world/la-fg-honduras-stein-qa-
20100510; and Luis Alonso Lugo, ―OEA define a integrantes de la 
comisión sobre Honduras,‖ Associated Press (AP), Washington, 17 May 
2010,  http://www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/2010/06/17/internacionales/28123.  
27
 Tracy Wilkinson, opp. Cit.  
28
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ―IACHR concerned 
about human rights violations in Honduras,‖ Press Release No. 54/10, 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras: May 19, 2010. 
16 
 
harassment received by human rights defenders, journalists, 
communicators, teachers, and members of the resistance.  Of 
particular concern to the Commission was the continuation 
of impunity for human rights violations and the ―acts of 
harassment directed against judges‖ who opposed the ouster.   
  
Reconciliation and the restoration of the social fabric will 
require more than implementing the CVR recommendations. 
The GOH must be attentive to citizens‘ sensitivities and 
concerns.  Some decisions have antagonized both 
―golpistas” and the ―resistencia.‖  For example, resistencia 
groups have been demanding accountability from those 
involved in the coup and instead, General Romeo Vázquez 
Velázquez, former head of the Honduran Armed Forces who 
led Zelaya‘s removal, was appointed to head the state-owned 
telecommunications company, HONDUTEL- a position 
often associated with opportunities for corruption-- leaving 
unanswered demands for justice.  Similarly, the president‘s 
trip to South Africa during the 2010 World Cup to support 
the Honduran team seemed reasonable, but taking along 
almost 100 government officials and not transferring 
authority to anyone before leaving was seen as irresponsible 
and out of touch with the people‘s hardship and anxieties.29  
 
The failure to curb corruption, as well as the increase in drug 
trafficking, places Honduras on high risk of state capture by 
criminal interests. Repeated administrations in Honduras 
have promised to fight corruption but often lack the political 
will to do so.   The Zelaya and Micheletti governments 
seemed to be no exception. In fact, the once credible 
National Anticorruption Council (Consejo Nacional 
                                                             
29
 ―Honduras sin gobierno ni autoridades: Lobo, su familia y sus 
funcionarios se fueron ayer para Sudáfrica,” Aporrea.org, 13 June 2010, 
http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n159253.html. 
17 
 
Anticorrupción—CAN) has practically collapsed.30  Under 
the current administration, conflict of interests and nepotism 
continue unabated.  Powerful entrepreneurs who have been 
appointed to the cabinet continue running their private 
businesses and several of the president‘s family members 
occupy government positions.
31
  
 
To address the third key stressor, crime and insecurity, the 
new GOH named Oscar Alvarez as Security Minister.  
Alvarez had a solid reputation for fighting crime under the 
Maduro administration.  Shortly after his new appointment, 
he ordered rapid interventions in key neighborhoods, often 
confiscating large caches of weapons.
32
  The impact of these 
operations will require some time to show results.  In the 
meantime, President Lobo‘s popular support dropped ten 
percent precisely because citizens fail to see tangible results 
from these offensives.
33
 
                                                             
30
 The twelve civil society organizations that make up the Council took 
different sides during the crisis, weakening its cohesion.  In October 
2009, the head of CNA was openly in support of the coup and hurt the 
institution‘s credibility.  Also, the Catholic Church removed its 
representatives in disagreement with the running of the institution in 
March 2010. 
31
 President Lobo‘s son, Jorge Dimitrio Lobo, was named governor of 
Olacho, Honduras‘ largest department. His daughter Tania is the country 
representative at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.  
His nephew Francisco Quesada Lobo is the Director of the Honduran 
Consulate in New York. The First Lady is the Coordinator of the 
Education for All Plan at the Ministry of Education.  
32
 Televisa, ―Honduras declara guerra a la delincuencia,‖ Noticiero 
Televisa, January  28, 2010, 
http://www2.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/internacional/america/133993/
honduras-declara-guerra-delincuencia.  
33
 ―Cae popularidad del presidente de Honduras por problemas de 
seguridad ciudadana,‖ América Economía, 1 June 2010, 
http://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/politica/cae-
popularidad-del-presidente-de-honduras-por-problemas-de-seguridad-ciu.  
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THE ROAD AHEAD  
 
Honduras faces many more challenges than those outlined 
here, both internally and externally. Perhaps none is more 
significant than the frustration of large segments of the 
population with ―politics as usual.‖ The polarization, distrust 
in the institutions, corruption, unemployment, crime and 
citizens insecurity, severe income inequalities, and growing 
hardships are elements that may lead to protests, particularly 
after the 2009 experience with taking to the streets to 
denounce the coup. Hondurans need reassurances that the 
democratic path is the right one. Failure to do so may 
provide opportunities for populist leaders to grow on fertile 
ground.  
 
There is consensus among observers that the Honduran 
government must provide tangible results.  For J. Marc Ruhl, 
for example, ―if the new chief executive simply pays no 
more than lip service to the need to attack poverty and 
inequality and to the importance of punishing the corrupt, 
popular support for democratic politics will likely resume its 
decline.‖34  Similarly, the Honduran Human Rights 
Commissioner has stated that, ―each day, the Honduran 
people feel more discontent, more unsatisfied and more 
anxious over demands for good health and education 
services.‖35   
 
The GOH has the opportunity to offer immediate relief to its 
citizens. It could design and implement a brief agenda that 
                                                             
34
 J. Mark Ruhl, opp. cit., p. 106. 
35
 ―Hay toda una burocracia montada a favor de la corrupción,‖ interview 
with the Human Rights Commissioner, June 21, 2010, 
http://www.conadeh.hn/Joomla/index.php/component/content/article/114
-hay-toda-una-burocracia-montada-a-favor-de-la-corrupcion. 
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brings about verifiable results within a short period of time. 
The primary objective should be to restore the social fabric 
by creating trust and credibility.  Such an agenda could focus 
on three issues:  promoting reconciliation, fighting 
corruption, and improving citizens‘ security.  Hondurans 
need rapid results in order to believe that change is possible, 
and thus be prepared to await much needed longer- term 
reforms.  Some initiatives that could produce results in the 
short term are:  
 
Reconciliation: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
is an important first step.  It needs to be inclusive and 
respond to the questions lingering in people‘s minds.  The 
final report should be disseminated broadly and without 
delay.  This would provide citizens a sense that the Lobo 
administration and the Commission are transparent and 
accountable.  The GOH should be readily prepared to 
implement the Commission‘s recommendations.  
 
Fighting Corruption: The GOH must provide clear 
indications that it is committed to preventing and fighting 
corruption.  Honduras has had some successful experiences 
in fighting corruption in the past. The mechanisms created to 
verify the use of Hurricane Mitch reconstruction funds, for 
example, were reliable and effective and included civil 
society participation.  Similarly, the National Anticorruption 
Council had gained a solid reputation; the government has 
drafted an Anticorruption Plan and some basic anticorruption 
laws have been enacted, including the Law on Transparency 
and Access to Information.   Reform of the judicial sector 
had also gained some momentum with the support of the US.  
 
Honduras requires broad, comprehensive anticorruption 
reform to fend off the capture of the state by drug trafficking 
organizations.  It needs to revamp the judicial and financial 
20 
 
sectors, restructure oversight institutions, and reform entities 
in charge of law enforcement.
36
   These reforms are much-
needed long-term goals. In the short term, the Lobo 
administration, with the assistance of the international 
community, could take decisive steps that show political will 
to fight corruption.  Among them:  
 
 Restore credibility of the National Anticorruption 
Commission.  It should be an independent entity with 
sufficient authority and resources to carry out 
initiatives to prevent and investigate corruption.   
 Demand asset declarations from cabinet members.  
This is a requirement of the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption that Honduras has 
signed.  Ministers should place businesses in blind 
trust while serving as government officials.  
 Drastically reduce corruption in customer services.  
The procedure to obtain licenses/permits or for 
paying fines/services, for example, can rapidly 
become efficient and transparent, helping build 
citizens trust in their institutions.  
 Revamp the Electoral Tribunal to generate 
confidence in elections.  
 Initiate reform of the Supreme Court of Justice and 
take the necessary measures to reduce impunity. 
                                                             
36
 USG will provide significant support in the coming year under the 
Merida Initiative. It will fund a variety of programs that will strengthen 
the institutional capabilities of participating governments by supporting 
efforts to investigate, sanction, and prevent corruption within law 
enforcement agencies; facilitating the transfer of critical law enforcement 
investigative information within and between regional governments; and 
funding equipment purchases, training, community policing, and 
economic and social development programs.  
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 Allocate the required budget to municipalities to 
ensure that the decentralization process moves 
forward.  The Americas Barometer surveys indicates 
that making resources available to improve the 
performance of local government and local civil 
society might pay off with a ―rebound‖ in those 
attributes of a political culture supportive of 
democratic institutions.  In Honduras, all politics is 
local.  
 
The international community, particularly the US, could 
assist the GOH in carrying out these tasks.   Since 2008, 
USAID reduced funding to Honduras‘ governance programs 
due to budget constraints. Yet, the Office of Inspector 
General has recommended that USAID/Honduras continue 
with the democracy and governance programs, which have 
had a significant impact on the judicial sector, and to provide 
funding for programs that would contribute to improving the 
quality of governance. Moreover, USAID could initiate 
specific anticorruption programs, particularly since 
Honduras was not included in the USAID Central American 
and Mexico Transparency and Governance Programs (CAM-
TAG).  Honduras needs assistance in fighting corruption and 
it needs it now.   
  
Citizens Security:  Revamping security and law 
enforcement institutions is an urgent matter, but not one that 
will provide immediate and visible results for the population.  
Yet, rapid and effective measures could be implemented to 
reduce opportunities for violence in local communities.  
Honduras already has experience with programs to address 
emergency situations.  In 1998, after Hurricane Mitch 
created a humanitarian crisis, the international community 
responded in kind.  The State Department‘s Office of 
Transition Initiatives provided substantial rapid respond 
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assistance to thousands of homeless people.  Mechanisms 
were implemented to ensure transparency and accountability 
in the handling of assistance funds.    
 
While having a rapid impact on reducing drug trafficking in 
Central America seems to be elusive, there is plenty of room 
to improve Honduras‘ judicial system. In recent years, US 
democracy and governance assistance to Honduras has 
helped increase the efficiency of criminal court procedure, 
and helped strengthen the formal legal framework for the 
justice system and citizen access to government information.   
These programs should be reinstituted and strengthened.  
Assistance could be provided for creating youth employment 
in high risk areas, community support for victims of crime, 
particularly women, and promoting citizens‘ involvement in 
taking back their neighborhoods.  Honduras has several rapid 
intervention initiatives already on the ground that could be 
strengthened and expanded. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The Honduran crisis of 2009 has exacerbated societal 
cleavages and created a demand for profound change.  The 
crisis may also provide the opportunity to seize the moment 
to transform Honduran society through democratic 
mechanisms. Failure to do so will leave the door open for 
populist politicians to promise change, most likely through 
non-democratic means.  Honduras also runs the risk of 
becoming a failed state subject to the interests of drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs) if corruption, inequality, 
social injustice, impunity, and disregard for the plight of the 
majority of the population continue unabated.  
 
Honduras has been a privileged recipient of international aid 
for several decades.  With that support, it has made strides in 
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the transition toward democracy, removed the Armed Forces 
from politics, provided space for citizens to participate and 
organize themselves, particularly at the local level, and has 
attempted to reform the judicial system.   It now needs 
profound reforms that will lead to global integration, 
economic growth, and social justice.  Charles A. Ford, 
former ambassador to Honduras, has called on the 
international community to seize this moment ―with the 
same urgency and conviction with which it responded‖ to the 
crisis following Hurricane Mitch or the current crisis in Haiti 
after the January 2010 earthquake.
37
 There are opportunities 
to initiate rapid response initiatives to empower Hondurans 
to embark on the difficult tasks of gaining trust among 
themselves and in their institutions. Maintaining ―politics as 
usual‖ does not augur well for the nation‘s future.  
  
                                                             
37
 Ambassador Charles A. Ford, retired, ―Re-setting our Engagement 
with Central America …‖ opp. cit., pp. 6.  
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